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COMMENTS
The North American Free Trade Agreement:
Sending U.S. Jobs South of the Border
I. Introduction
Since 1949, the United States has engaged in comprehensive
free trade negotiations with other countries.' Prior to the 1980s, the
United States pursued these negotiations only in the multilateral set-
ting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2 How-
ever, for the past decade, change has been brewing. Born in the
Reagan Administration and nurtured by President George Bush, a
modem ideological world view, based on the vitality of private capi-
tal and free market enterprise, spurred our government to create
free trade agreements (FTAs)3 with countries outside of the GATT
setting.4 The Bush Administration, committed to expanded trade
and investment opportunities, views FTAs as "essential to our eco-
nomic well-being,'" and statistical evidence indicates that greater re-
I The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created in 1947 during
the aftermath of World War II and governs the trade of some 107 countries. RAYMOND J.
AHEARN & FRANCIS T. MIKO, U.S. LIBR. OF CONG., CONG. RES. SERVICES, REPORT No. 88-
249 F, U.S. CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS, 2 (Mar. 30,
1988).
2 U.S. LIBR. OF CONG., CONG. RES. SERVICES, REPORT No. 91-282 E, NORTH AMERI-
CAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS I (Mar. 25, 1991, updated Aug. 12,
1991) [hereinafter NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS].
3 A FTA traditionally is entered into by two or more countries and eliminates tariff
and nontariff barriers that restrict trade between them; these countries maintain barriers
against third countries. Id. Expected North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
provisions include the elimination of tariffs, the establishment of copyright, patent and
trademark protections, and the institution of dispute settlement procedures. JOHN SHARP,
TEXAS COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, SPECIAL FINANCIAL REPORT, THE U.S.-MEXICO
FREE-TRADE PACT: PAYOFFS AND TRADEOFFS 2 (Nov. 1991) [hereinafter TEXAS COMPTROL-
LER SPECIAL REPORT].
4 Presently the United States has a FTA with Israel, which went into effect on Sep-
tember 1, 1985, and a FTA with Canada, which became effective on January 1, 1989.
NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 1. The United States also has a legislative
program with countries in the Caribbean Basin. Latin America: Bush to Seek Action on Enter-
prisefor Americas Initiative, Daily Rep. Executives (BNA) No. 10, at S-10 (Jan. 15, 1992).
Eighty-eight percent of top North American executives believe that the world econ-
omy is "shifting in the direction of regional trading blocs" and that this shift will hurt
GATT. Jonathan Lemco, Richard Belous & Laura Subrin, The Free Trade Agreement and
Labor: An American View, 41 LAB. L.J. 460, 461 (1990).
5 Letter from Carla A. Hills, U. S. Trade Representative, to the Honorable John D.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
liance on trade might boost our economy out of its current recession.
For example, in 1990, exports rose by over eight percent and ac-
counted for 88 percent of the growth in the U.S. Gross National
Product. 6
The most recent expression of President Bush's reverence for
free trade is called the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative,7 which
envisions a free trade area encompassing our entire hemisphere. 8
The Initiative is a package of measures including the decrease or
elimination of trade tariffs, new programs to stimulate increased for-
eign investment, stronger emphasis on environmental protection in
the hemisphere, and the partial reduction of Latin America's debt to
the United States.9 The first step toward unwrapping the total pack-
age is the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) between Canada, the United States, and Mexico.' 0 Such
an agreement would create a North American trading bloc with a 6
trillion dollar gross national product and 362 million consumers. I I
The proposed trading bloc would enable the United States to
ante up at the trading table with the European Common Market.
However, there are significant differences between the European
Community and the "North American community;" for example, the
gap in per capita income between rich and poor countries within the
European Community is only one-fifth of the gap between the
United States and Mexico.' 2
The strongest opponents of NAFTA are U.S. labor groups' 3
Dingell, U. S. Representative (Apr. 10, 1991) (on file with the University of North Carolina
Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation).
6 d. Interestingly, despite increased U.S. dependence on world trade, GATT econ-
omists expect final numbers for 1991 to show a substantial decline in the growth of world
trade, following in the wake of three consecutive years of slowing growth. Uruguay Round:
U.S. Election-Year Politics Likely to Cause Complications, Daily Rep. Executives (BNA) No. 10, at
S-3 (Jan. 15, 1992).
7 Latin America: Bush to Seek Action on Enterprise for Americas Initiative, Daily Rep. Execu-
tives (BNA) No. 10, at S-10 (Jan. 15, 1992).
8 Id. Once NAFTrA is complete, Chile is "widely expected to be the next candidate
for free trade negotiations with the U.S." Id. Also, the countries of Latin and Central
America have engaged in free trade negotiations amongst themselves: Mexico, Colombia,
and Venezuela plan to conclude a free trade agreement by 1995; Mexico, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica hope to finalize a free trade agreement by
1996. d.
9 Id.
10 Id.
I I TEXAS COMPTROLLER SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 17.
12 Lane Kirkland, Free Trade With Mexico Would Be a Disaster for Workers, L.A. DAILY J.,
Apr. 26, 1991, at 6. Notably, the European Common Market contains a $68 billion Re-
gional Development Fund to narrow this gap, as well as a "Social Charter setting rights to
social assistance, collective bargaining, vocational training and health and safety protec-
tions." Id.
13 LENORE SEK, U.S. LIBR. CONG., CONG. RES. SERVICES, REP. No. IB90140, NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 6 (Dec. 3, 1991). "Organized labor made killing the
NAFTA negotiations its first legislative objective in 1991." Judith H. Bello & Alan F.
Holmer, North America's Common Market, AM. LAW., Nov. 1991 (Supp.), at 38.
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who claim that NAFTA will "encourage greater capital outflows from
the United States, bring about an increase in imports from Mexico,
reduce domestic employment as the United States moves deeper into
a recession, and accelerate the process of deindustrialization that has
confronted this country during the 1980s."' 14 This Comment will ex-
amine the events leading to the proposed NAFTA and the "fast
track" authority these treaty negotiations have received, explore the
possible effects of NAFTA on U.S. and Mexican labor, and discuss
the criticisms and the merits of NAFTA. This Comment concludes
that the passage of NAFTA is inevitable, and that the President and
Congress must be accountable for NAFTA's dramatic negative ef-
fects on U.S. labor.
II. Background
A. The Breakdown of GATT
While GATT, since its 1949 inception, has facilitated large-scale
expansion of trade and investment flows among its 107 partici-
pants,15 it has been vigorously prodded by eight "rounds" of amend-
ments and has become known as the "Gentlemen's Agreement to
Talk and Talk."' 16
Over the years, some of the key GATT principles have weak-
ened. For example, Article 1 of GATT contains the most-favored-
nation (MFN) principle which commits GATT member countries to
extend trade concessions unconditionally to each other and thus,
prevents a return to the "discriminatory and politically destabilizing
trade practices of the 1930s."' 17 The MFN principle was intended to
assure that all GATT members have equal access to each others'
markets and to prohibit exclusive trading between only some GATT
countries. The MFN principle safeguards the rights of potentially
excluded countries by encouraging trade with the lowest-cost pro-
ducer.' 8 But through time, the MFN principle has been seriously un-
dermined by "free riders,"' 19 and by non-tariff barriers such as
quotas and export restraint agreements. 20
14 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR & CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, PUB.
No. 0-220-0391-5, EXPLOITING BOTH SIDES: U.S.-MEXICO FREE TRADE 1 (Feb. 1991) [here-
inafter AFL-CIO PUBLICATION].
15 "World trade grew nearly twice as fast as world production in the 1950s and 1960s
and international direct investment flows averaged about 12 percent a year over the 1960-
73 period." AHEARN & MIKO, supra note 1, at 3.
16 Bello & Holmer, supra note 13, at 38. The current Uruguay Round was initiated in
September 1986 in order to reduce trade barriers around the globe. It was supposed to
conclude in December 1991 but did not. Id.
17 AHEARN & MIKO, supra note 1, at 3.
18 Id.
19 A free rider is a country which makes no concessions of its own, but allows other
countries to engage in trade liberalizing negotiations. Id.
20 Id.
19921
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One exception to the MFN principle is the "free trade area" de-
fined in Article XXIV of GATT as "a group of two or more customs
territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations ...
are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent
territories in products originating in such territories." 2 ' So as long
as the United States, Canada, and Mexico (all GAIT members) com-
ply with the definitional requirements of a free trade area, the MFN
requirement is properly waived. 22
B. The US-Canada FTA
Against the backdrop of a convoluted and ever-changing GATE,
the first and fourth most influential signatories2 3 to GATE negoti-
ated their own FTA.2 4 On January 2, 1988, President Reagan and
Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney signed an FTA which created a
free trade area encompassing Canada and the U.S., and eliminated a
wide range of tariff and non-tariff barriers 25 over the following ten-
year period.2 6
By granting each other preferential treatment beyond tariff elim-
ination that is not extended to the rest of the world, in areas such as
investment, intellectual property rights, and trade in services, Can-
ada and the U.S. subjected the MFN principle to further strain. They
have arguably exhibited a vote of no confidence in GAIT by adopt-
ing this agreement. 27 However, other than its effects on GATT, the
consequences of a FTA with Canada are viewed by most observers as
largely positive. 28 Canada has wage levels, 29 living standards, and
21 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 1878, art. XXIV, § 8(b).
22 Craig L. Jackson, The President's Report to Congress on the Likely Effects of NAFTA on U.S.
Labor - An Examination, CURRENTS, Winter 1991, at 47, 48.
23 AHEARN & MIKO, supra note 1, at 4.
24 Canada proposed negotiation of an FTA with the United States, primarily due to
the fact that the United States purchases 80% of Canadian exports. Id. at 7.
25 Examples of non-tariff barriers include quotas, discriminatory government pro-
curement policies, health and safety standards, anti-dumping measures, and counter-
vailing duties. Gordon Betcherman & Morley Gunderson, Canada-U.S. Free Trade & Labour
Relations, 41 LAB. L.J. 454, 454 n.1 (1990).
26 AHEARN & MIKO, supra note 1, at iii.
27 Id. at 4. Article XXIV of GATT allows free trade areas to eliminate tariff and non-
tariff barriers on substantially all the trade of the participants within a reasonable length of
time (interpreted as 10 years) as long as participants do not increase barriers to non-FTA
countries so that they are higher than before the FTA was established. NAFTA: ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 2.
However, NAFTA negotiations are arguably going beyond the areas here-to-date con-
sidered by countries establishing free trade areas pursuant to Article XXIV, and are thus
pushing the GATT definition of a free trade area to further boundaries. Jackson, supra
note 22, at 48.
28 AHEARN & MIKO, supra note 1, at 12.
29 The average hourly wage in U.S. dollars in the manufacturing sector in 1988 was
$13.85 in the United States and $13.53 in Canada. AFL-CIO PUBLICATION, supra note 14,
at 3.
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regulatory structures similar to those of the United States.30 Labor
groups, which historically viewed the Canadian union movement
with envy, 3' generally did not oppose the FTA with Canada, perhaps
because Canada has a strong social welfare system, and Canada is
more favorably disposed to economic subsidies, large social spend-
ing, and regulatory controls than the United States.
C. The US-Canada-Mexico FTA
U.S. labor groups' interest peaked on June 12, 1991, when trade
ministers from the United States, Canada, and Mexico met in To-
ronto to formally negotiate the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment.3 2 Their goal was to complete a comprehensive FTA by spring
1992 so that the U.S. Congress could enact implementing legislation
before adjourning for the November 1992 elections, and NAFTA
could enter into force in January of 1993.
33
Although the Canadian economy and the U.S. economy are rela-
tively similar and Canadian concerns in NAFTA parallel those of the
United States, Mexico is at a very different stage of economic devel-
opment than the United States or Canada. For example, Mexico's
gross national product is thirty-five percent lower than the gross
state product of Texas. 34 For this reason, most of U.S labor's con-
cerns about NAFTA focus on Mexico, not Canada.3 5 Most criticisms
launched by U.S. labor groups against NAFTA stem from three ma-
jor areas: (1) "the huge gap in wage levels" 36 and difference in total
labor costs between the United States and Mexico, (2) the continua-
tion and expansion of the maquiladora program, and (3) the granting
of fast track authority to negotiate NAFTA. Understanding these ar-
eas begins with an overview of the Mexican economy.
III. History of the Mexican Economy
From 1930 to 1980, the Mexican government employed a deep
nationalist attitude and maintained a policy of inward development
30 Id. at 2.
31 Lemco, Belous, & Subrin, supra note 4, at 464.
32 U.S. LIAR. CONG., CONG. RES. SERVICES, REP. No. 1B90140, NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT I (updated Dec. 3, 1991). In August 1990, Mexico's President Salinas
formally proposed negotiations. On February 5, 1991, Presidents Bush and Salinas and
Prime Minister Mulroney announced that they intended to negotiate trilaterally toward
NAFTA. NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 2.
33 Bello & Holmer, supra note 13, at 38. In December 1991, U.S. Trade Representa-
tive Carla Hills suggested that a draft of NAFTA should be completed by the end ofJanu-
ary 1992, but she did not say whether submission of the agreement to Congress would be
delayed until after the 1992 presidential elections. North American Free Trade Agreement: Elec-
tion Could Affect Timing, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 10, at S-8 (Jan. 15, 1992).
34 TEXAS COMPTROLLER SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
35 NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 2.
36 AFL-CIO PUBLICATION, supra note 14, at 2.
1992]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
and complete governmental regulation of investment.3 7 Mexico
adopted policies of import substitution, consisting of a general pro-
tection of the entire industrial sector,38 and domestic subsidies. The
legacy of these policies was an "uncompetitive industrial structure, a
burdensome debt, and an institutionalized incapacity for self-sus-
taining growth"3 9 and led to a debt crisis in 1982.40
The 1982 debt crisis resulted in a major shift in economic strate-
gies, as Mexico was forced to modernize via privatization, tax reform,
and trade and investment liberalization.4 1 Since 1982, Mexico has
become one of the more open economies in the world 42 and a model
among the major debtor countries due to its adherence to economic
austerity programs which enjoy the backing of the International
Monetary Fund, commercial banks, and the United States. 43 Mex-
ico's import tariffs have been reduced, increased investment by for-
eign businesses has been promoted, its government deficit sharply
reduced, and its debt rescheduled; however, Mexico's efforts to
reshape its economy have resulted in rising unemployment 44 and de-
clining living standards.45 For example, since 1980, the purchasing
power of Mexico's minimum wage has fallen by almost sixty per-
cent.46 President Salinas, therefore, has a high stake in trade talks
with the United States since his efforts to further open the Mexican
37 Alejandro Ogarrio & Leonel Pereznieto Castro, Mexico-United States Relations: Eco-
nomic Integration and Foreign Investment, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 223, 226 (1990).
38 NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 3.
39 ALFRED REIFMAN, U.S. LIBR. CONG., CONG. RES. SERVICES, REP. No. 91-418 RCO,
A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AREA? A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE MAJOR ISSUES 1, 2-3 (May
17, 1991) (quoting Peter Morici, Trade Talks with Mexico: A Time for Realism (Apr. 1991)
(unpublished paper, University of Maine)).
40 Before 1982, Mexico was embarking on eager development schemes and rapidly
rising living standards through governmental spending. The money came from the dis-
covery of huge oil deposits in Mexico at a time when world oil prices were rising, and from
loans from international banks relying on Mexico's prosperous future. However, the gov-
ernment failed to adjust the value of the peso downward to compensate for inflation, so
dollar-denominated loans were paid off with inflated pesos. Then, due to rising interna-
tional interest rates, a spreading world recession, and falling oil prices, the $6.1 billion
foreign debt of 1970 escalated to $81 billion in 1982. U.S. LIBR. CONG., CONG. RES. SERV-
ICES, REP. No. IB91061, MEXICO-U.S. RELATIONS IN THE SALINAS PERIOD (1988-1994): Is-
SUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (Dec. 3, 1991) [hereinafter MEXICO-U.S. RELATIONS IN THE SALINAS
PERIOD].
41 NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 4.
42 Ogarrio & Castro, supra note 37, at 233.
43 Id. Mexico's inflation rate went from 287 percent to a 16 percent rate in four years,
and Mexico has a $3 billion trade surplus for the first time. International Trade, Mexico Looks
Towards New Ties with North America, Salinas Says, Daily Rep. Executives (BNA) No. 190, at A-
8 (Oct. 1, 1991).
44 In 1989, Mexico's unemployment rate was 20%, as compared to 5.2% in the
United States, and 7.5% in Canada. AFL-CIO PUBLICATION, supra note 14, at 3.
4,5 MEXICO-U.S. RELATIONS IN THE SALINAS PERIOD, supra note 40, at 5.
46 David Bacon, Union Leaders on Both Sides of the Border Greet the Proposal With Some
Trepidation, L.A. DAILYJ., April 18, 1991, at 6.
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economy depend upon ever-expanding access to foreign markets. 47
If President Salinas fails to achieve access to the rich U.S. market, his
economic strategy is "perhaps doomed" and Mexico is "in danger of
slipping into permanent lethargy and political instability. ' 48 Mexico,
being the most historically protected and smallest market of the
countries in NAFTA, clearly has the most to gain from its
enactment.
4 9
IV. The Maquiladora Program
The idea of increased trade between Mexico and the United
States is not a novel one. In the 1960s, U.S. companies arranged
private contracts with Mexican landowners, allowing U.S. manufac-
tured components to be assembled in industrial parks built by Mexi-
can landowners on their land. 50 These contracts eventually became
the maquiladoras program which was formally established in 1965. 5 1
Under the program, import duties on intermediate materials are
suspended as long as eighty percent of all final products are ex-
ported.52 Although the maquiladoras were originally restricted to the
Mexican border area, such manufacturing plants are now allowed to
be established in the interior of the country. 5 3 The number of maqui-
ladoras has grown significantly from 12 in 1965 to 2,066 as of Sep-
tember 1991,54 and the program now accounts for 45% of all U.S.
47 REIFMAN, supra note 39, at 3 (citing Peter Morici, Trade Talks with Mexico: A Time for
Realism (Apr. 1991) (unpublished paper, University of Maine)).
48 Id. The United States accounts for over two-thirds of Mexico's total trade. In
1989, for example, the United States imported $27.2 billion from Mexico. Testimony of
Carla A. Hills, U.S. Trade Representative Before the Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and
Means, U.S. House of Representatives, June 14, 1990, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 583, 583 (1991).
49 REIFMAN, supra note 39, at 3. Mexico may also have to make the most concessions
if NAFTA demands that Mexico "come up to" U.S. and Canadian standards regarding
workers' rights, the environment, intellectual property rights, and general economic pol-
icy. Id.
50 ANGELES M. VILLAREAL, U.S. LIBR. CONG., CONG. RES. SERVICES, REP. No. 91-
706E, MEXICO'S MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY I (Sept. 27, 1991).
51 Id. These agreements were encouraged by the U.S. and Mexican governments to
combat the high unemployment expected to coincide with the 1964 cancellation of the
Bracero Program, which allowed Mexican workers to obtain seasonal farm work in the
United States. Id. Currently, there are maquiladoras with parent companies in foreign coun-
tries such as France, Japan, Sweden, Canada, and England, but the majority of maquiladoras
are U.S.-owned. Id. at 9.
52 NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 19. Before 1983, the export re-
striction required all final products to be exported. Id.
53 VILLAREAL, supra note 50, at 1. Only 17% of all Mexican maquiladoras are located in
the Mexican interior. Id.
54 Id. at 5-6. As of September 1991, 455,780 people were employed in the maqui-
ladoras, and 66% of these workers were women. Id. at 6, 7.
The growth of maquiladoras is largely due to favorable tariff provisions under Provi-
sions 9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule which place duties on
the total value of the exported products minus the costs of the U.S. components. NAFTA:
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 19.
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imports from Mexico. 55 Most of the biggest U.S. manufacturers now
have maquiladora plants, including "General Motors, Ford, Chrysler,
Rockwell International, General Electric, Lockheed, Gulfstream
Aerospace, Honeywell, Johnson and Johnson, Mattel and 3M." 56
The maquiladora program is portrayed as a "miniature version"
of how U.S.-Mexico free trade could be developed, 57 and commenta-
tors suggest that NAFTA is merely a continuation of the maquiladora
program. But a closer look at the program reveals a repugnant situa-
tion clearly not deserving of expansion. For example, even though
these plants are "state-of-the-art technologically, they now average
about 98 cents an hour in wages and benefits." 58 Furthermore,
workers are described as "living in cardboard hovels with no running
water or sanitation facilities, raw sewage and industrial toxins
dumped into rivers that provide recreation and drinking water."'5 9
There is a "worsening air and pollution problem along the bor-
der" 60 as well as a lack of adequate "electricity, roads, and
housing." 6 1
Significantly, the result of the maquiladoras has been "a lessening
of U.S. workers and production and an increase of Mexican produc-
tion for the U.S. market."'62 If this trend continues, one of NAFTA's
justifications (opening up the Mexican market for U.S. products) will
simply be served by U.S. businesses moving to Mexico and serving
the Mexican market from within. 63
On January 27, 1992, hope appeared that conditions in the ma-
quiladoras may improve. Mexican workers organized strikes against
companies refusing to meet union demands for a 30 percent wage
increase.64 ByJanuary 30, all but two of the nine companies affected
by the strike agreed to a 25.4 percent wage increase, including three
General Motors subsidiaries and Magnatech. 65 The talks affect
55 AFL-CIO PUBLICATION, supra note 14, at 4.
56 VILLAREAL, supra note 50, at 9.
57 Kirkland, supra note 12, at 6.
58 Harley Shaiken, Mexico's Poorly Paid Workers Are as Highly Skilled as Their U.S. Counter-
parts, L.A. DAILYJ., May 29, 1991, at 6.
59 Kirkland, supra note 12, at 6.
60 VILLAREAL, supra note 50, at 7. Hazardous waste generated by maquiladoras from
materials of U.S. origin is currently allowed importation into the United States under an
executive agreement between the United States and Mexico. See Thomas E. Burck, Note,
Is Foreign Hazardous Waste Really the Same as Domestic Hazardous Waste When Imported into the
U.S.?, 17 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 401 (1992).
61 VILLAREAL, supra note 50, at 7.
62 SEK, supra note 13, at 50-51.
63 Id. at 51.
64 United Auto Workers Sends Assistance to Mexican Workers Striking Maquiladoras, Daily
Rep. Executives (BNA) No. 21, at A-19 (Jan. 31, 1992). The Union which instigated the
walk-out was the Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos. Id. Workers walked out of
four companies on January 27, 1992. Id. Four more companies were hit the following day.
Id. One other plant was hit on Jan. 29. Id.
65 Id.
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about 32,500 workers who earn an average of $2.73 an hour in wages
and benefits.66
V. Fast Track Authority
Whether Congress should grant President Bush an extension of
fast track authority was, in the first half of 1991, "the most important
congressional issue concerning trade negotiations. '67 Fast-track au-
thority, authorized under section 161 of the Trade Act of 1974, is a
"complex set of parliamentary rules ... enacted into statutory law" 68
which allows for expedited NAFTA negotiations, and requires Con-
gress to vote up or down on NAFTA without offering any amend-
ments. 69 President Bush was originally granted fast-track authority
under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 which
required him to enter into an agreement by May 31, 1991.70 The
Administration later claimed that an extension of fast-track authority
was "necessary" for NAFTA negotiations. 7' The request for a two-
year extension was granted by Congress; thus fast-track authority ex-
pires in June of 1993.72 The two-year extension applies to any FTA
negotiated before June 1, 1993, including any agreement reached in
the current Uruguay Round of GATT and under the Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative. 73
Although President Bush is required under fast track authority
to adequately consult with Congress, 74 NAFTA opponents claim that
the Administration is asking for a "blank check" from Congress to
negotiate an agreement which "deserves more consideration, exami-
nation, and debate in the Congress and the nation than the 'fast
track' process would allow."' 75 Fast-track authority arguably enables
66 Id.
67 SEK, supra note 13, at 7.
68 Jeffrey M. Lang, The Congressional-Executive Consultation Process in International Trade
Negotiations in U.S. LIBR. CONG., CONG. RES. SERVICES, REP. No. 91-786 E, NORTH AMERI-
CAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS 78, 81 (Oct. 22, 1991).
69 Trade Talks Should Include Environment, Citizen Groups Tell House Rules Panel, Daily
Rep. Executives (BNA) No. 201, at A-17 (Oct. 17, 1991). The purpose of fast-track is to
"induce the Congress to consider approval or disapproval of the agreement as a complete
package of negotiated concessions and to deter amendments that might affect the nature
of the agreement or benefit individual interests." SEK, supra note 13, at 7.
70 Id. This Act provided for a two-year extension of fast-track if President Bush re-
quested the extension before March 1, 1991, and neither branch of Congress adopted an
extension disapproval resolution by June 1, 1991. Both of these conditions were satisfied.
Id. at 7-8.
71 Id. at 7.
72 Waxman Urges Congress Not to Pass Pacts Without Health, Safety Guarantees, Daily Rep.
Executives (BNA) No. 226, at A-6 (Nov. 22, 1991). The House approved the request for
extended fast-track authority 231-192 on May 23, 1991, and the Senate followed the next
day by approving the measure 59-36. Id.
73 SEK, supra note 13, at 8.
74 If Congress decides that it has not been properly conferred with, it can withdraw
the fast-track authority it has already granted the President. Id. at 8.
75 AFL-CIO PUBLICATION, supra note 14, at 8.
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NAFTA proponents to avoid discussion and public debate over dis-
tasteful issues such as the poor living conditions of workers, the use
of child labor in the maquiladoras, and the lack of adequate environ-
mental protection and worker safety laws in Mexico.76
Apparently expanding the secrecy that fast track authority con-
notes, NAFTA negotiations have been conducted without shedding
any light on the specifics of the developing agreement. For example,
when top U.S., Mexican, and Canadian negotiators met for a week in
Dallas, Texas in February 1992, they issued no daily communiqu6s
and did not publicly release a status report when the week con-
cluded. 77 The negotiators stated that the "complexity of the issues"
prevented them from disclosing the details of the talks to the
public. 78
VI. The Effects of NAFrA
A. The Wage and Labor Costs Gap
Naturally, the issue of wage levels is very sensitive and important
to U.S. labor groups. Workers are wary that they may be forced to
accept much lower wages in order to entice their employers to main-
tain U.S. plants rather than relocating the plants in Mexico. 79 The
question that remains unanswered, at least until NAFTA is enacted
and its effects are monitored, is whether U.S. wages will be pulled
down by competition from cheaper labor across the border or
whether growth stimulated in Mexico's economy by the elimination
of trade barriers will create more demand for U.S. goods and thus
lead to greater U.S. productivity growth in affected industries, and
ultimately higher U.S. wages.80 However, when told that Americans
will find new jobs and higher wages in industries producing goods
for the newly opened Mexican market, U.S. workers may question
the viability of this huge, new Mexican market and ask: "What do
they propose we sell to people who earn $27 a week?" 8'
The steps taken since the early 1980s to modernize and stabilize
the Mexican economy, including government control of wages,
prices, and the dollar/peso exchange rate,8 2 resulted in the country's
low 1989 average wage in. manufacturing of $2.20 per hour as op-
76 Kirkland, supra note 12, at 6.
77 NAFTA Negotiators Deny 'Dark Secrets'at Start of Week-Long Talks in Dallas, Daily Rep.
Executives (BNA) No. 33, at A-4 (Feb. 19, 1992).
78 Id.
79 In the early 1980s, outside of Cleveland, General Motors subsidiary Packard Elec-
tric urged workers to take a pay cut from $18 to $6 an hour; workers eventually accepted a
50% wage and benefit reduction for new hires. Shaiken, supra note 58, at 6.
80 NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 35.
81 Kirkland, supra note 12, at 6.
82 NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 35. Because the U.S. dollar signifi-
cantly appreciated against other currencies in the early 1980s, real Mexican wages de-
clined 40% in U.S. dollar-terms between 1981 and 1989. Id.
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posed to an average manufacturing wage of $14.30 per hour in the
United States. 83 It is estimated that around 40% of the Mexican
work force earn less than $3.50 per day.8 4
Some theorize that as foreign investment flows into Mexico, up-
ward pressure will be placed on Mexican wages.8 5 However, this has
not been the result in the maquiladora areas where "despite a five-fold
increase in the number of Mexicans employed at these plants, from
100,000 to over half a million, there was no corresponding increase
in wage rates." '86
U.S. labor groups are wary not only of Mexico's lower wages,
but also of lower total Mexican labor costs. "Mexico is not burdened
or controlled by minimum wage, insurance benefits, employee
safety, workers compensation, [or] unemployment benefits." 87 One
vocal group, citrus growers in Florida, does not think it can compete
with Mexican growers who enjoy government subsidies and freedom
from environmental and food safety requirements; 88 also most Mexi-
can growers farm state-owned land and thus do not pay for its use. 89
Other union representatives also tell of U.S domestic plant closings
due to competition from imported products.90 However, a study
sponsored by the Farm Bureau concluded that NAFTA would benefit
some U.S. producers. For example, grain and oilseed producers and
dairy farmers may benefit from freer exports to Mexico as Mexico's
demand for these products increases faster than Mexico's domestic
ability to produce them. 91 Likewise, the U.S. automobile industry,
which is producing more cars than it can sell, should be interested in
increasing exports to Mexico which may become "the largest grow-
83 REIFMAN, supra note 39, at 8. The combined benefits and wages for a Mexican
worker equal a little more than two dollars an hour, while in the United States, they total
over $35 an hour. Shaiken, supra note 58, at 6.
84 Bacon, supra note 46, at 6.
85 Conference Board's Labor Experts Predict High Unemployment, Small Wage Gains in '92,
Daily Rep. Executives (BNA) No. 222, at A-15 (Nov. 18, 1991).
86 Shaiken, supra note 58, at 6. The maquiladoran worker makes an average of "five
dollars per day plus a free lunch." Matilde K. Stephenson, Mexico's Maquiladora Program:
Challenges and Prospects, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 589, 595 (1991).
87 Citrus, Vegetable Growers Tell Panel That NAFTA Could Ruin U.S. Industries, Daily Rep.
Executives (BNA) No. 169, at A-I I (Aug. 30, 1991) (quoting N. Perry Hansen, Executive
Vice President and General Manager of the Waverly Growers Cooperative).
88 Florida Agriculture Commissioner Bob Crawford says Mexican produce is grown
with pesticides that are illegal in the U.S. and that there is no adequate regulatory program
in Mexico to guarantee that such produce is safe to eat. Id.
89 Id. In Florida, the average estimated value of an acre of raw citrus land is $2,774.
Id.
90 For example, Vice President and Regional Director of the International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union Nicholas S. Bonanno says a NAFTA including apparel would
have "a devastating effect on jobs." Id.
91 Most Agriculture Sectors Unlikely To be Harmed by NAFTA, Report Says, Daily Rep. Exec-
utives (BNA) No. 222, at A-13 (Nov. 18, 1991).
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ing North American market for automobiles for the next decade." 92
As U.S. labor groups express their concerns that U.S. businesses
will be enticed by low Mexican wages and labor costs and will pack
up and run for the border, the Bush Administration responds that
the United States will gain more than it loses if trade barriers are
removed. 93 The Administration also argues that businesses will con-
sider many factors before they close their U.S. plants, including "in-
frastructure, proximity to markets and other corporate operations,
telecommunications, skilled and reliable labor, [and] political stabil-
ity."' 9 4 One author states that "there is no national advantage to be
gained in barring imports from Mexico" since paying American
workers around $12 more an hour only drains that twelve dollars
from the rest of the economy. 95 The author goes on to say that the
United States could buy products from Mexico, "pay the Americans
thereby thrown out of work $10 an hour to do absolutely nothing"
and still be better off.9 6
B. The Loss of Jobs
Studies show that while gains from trade may be net gains, they
are accompanied by "reduced employment opportunities and adjust-
ment burdens for workers in import-competing industries, involving
extended periods of job search, retraining, and relocation." '97 Fur-
thermore, workers displaced from trade-impacted sectors have
"longer periods of joblessness than other displaced workers." 98
Therefore, labor organizations presumably have valid concerns that
the work force may be drastically affected by a rash of FTAs. These
labor groups can point to the U.S.-Canadian FTA as evidence that
jobs are lost as a result of FTAs. According to the president of the
Canadian Labour Congress, "Canada's current depressed economic
conditions are directly attributable to the U.S.-Canada [FTA]" since
multinational companies, mostly U.S. firms, have closed their doors
in Canada and moved to Mexico or back to the U.S. 99 Furthermore,
Canada's New Democratic Party Leader is urging Prime Minister
Mulroney to withdraw from NAFTA talks, stating that since the Can-
92 Roh Reiterates Position that NAFTA Talks Will Not Be Driven by Artificial Deadline, Daily
Rep. Executives (BNA) No. 217, at A-14 (Nov. 8, 1991).
93 Bello & Holmer, supra note 13, at 38.
94 Id.
95 Michael Kinsley, Free Trade with Mexico: The Arguments Against the Proposed Pact Don't
Hold Water, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 18, 1991, at 6.
96 Id.
97 U.S. LIBR. CONG., CONG. RES. SERVICES, REP. No. IB89129, EMPLOYMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF CHANGING FOREIGN ECONOMIES 4 (June 4, 1991)
[hereinafter EMPLOYMENT IN THE U.S.] (citing a 1981 study by Michael C. Aho and James
A. Orr).
98 Id. at 5.
99 Rep. Berman Defends Vote For Fast Track Authority for Trade Pact with Mexico, Daily Rep.
Executives (BNA) No. 11, at A-20 (Jan. 16, 1992).
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ada-U.S. FTA was implemented, "Canada has lost some 400,000
jobs and trade relations are at an all-time low."' 0 0
NAFTA supporters, including International Trade Commis-
sioner Don Newquist, answer that U.S. employers are already shift-
ing work to Mexico and will continue to do so even without
NAFTA.' 0 l These supporters argue that a "good" NAFTA is neces-
sary to stop the U.S.-to-Mexico job drain. 10 2 These same NAFTA
proponents would argue that U.S. jobs are already being lost due to
access to "low-cost labor in Ireland, Portugal, India, and Southeast
Asia."' 0 3 However, Mexico is much closer to the U.S. than these
countries, and is the fact that U.S. businesses are already in search of
cheap foreign labor a good reason for giving them the linchpin of
security they need in Mexico?
Along the same lines, if NAFTA encourages U.S. businesses to
relocate in, or open, additional facilities in Mexico, this investment in
Mexico could stimulate demand for U.S. products such as finished
goods or inputs in the production process which could increase job
opportunities in the United States. However, there is no guarantee
that Mexico will purchase finished goods or production supplies
from the United States rather than from other sources.' 0 4
Several economic models have been constructed to determine
the effect of NAFTA, and two of these studies estimate that the
number of actual U.S. jobs lost due to enacting NAFTA would be
between 19,000 and 32,000 jobs. 10 5 However, these two studies do
not address potential investment shifts or the closing of U.S. plants
as a result of investment shifts. 10 6 Two studies taking into account
investment shifts estimate larger job losses due to NAFTA of be-
100 Mulroney Talks Tough on Disputes but Plans No Retaliatory Action, Daily Rep. Executives
(BNA) No. 47, at A-15 (March 10, 1992).
101 ITC'S Newquist Questions U.S. Worker Skills For Jobs Created Under NAFTA, Daily Rep.
Executives (BNA) No. 220, at A-17 (Nov. 11, 1991).
102 Rep. Berman Defends Vote For Fast Track Authority For Trade Pact With Mexico, supra note
99, at A-20.
103 Conference Board's Labor Experts Predict High Unemployment, Small Wage Gains in '92,
supra note 85, at A-15.
104 NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 25.
105 Id. A Peat Marwick study estimates a job gain of about 27,000 and a job loss of
about 32,000. Id. (citing KPMG PEAT MARWICK (POLICY ECONOMICS GROUP) FOR THE U.S.
COUNCIL OF THE MEXICO-U.S. BUSINESS COMMrITEE, THE EFFECTS OF A FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND MEXICO, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Feb. 27, 1991)). A Uni-
versity of Maryland study estimates a job gain of about 63,000 and a job loss of about
19,000. Id. (citing UNIV. OF MARYLAND, INTERINDUSTRY ECONOMIC RESEARCH FUND, INC.
FOR THE U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, INDUSTRIAL EFFECTS OF A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
MEXICO AND THE USA (Sept. 15, 1990)).
106 Id. (citing KPMG PEAT MARWICK (POLICY ECONOMICS GROUP) FOR THE U.S. COUN-
CIL OF THE MEXICO-U.S. BUSINESS COMMITTEE, THE EFFECTS OF A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND MEXICO, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Feb. 27, 1991), and UNIV. OF MARY-
LAND, INTERINDUSTRY ECONOMIC RESEARCH FUND, INC. FOR THE U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, IN-
DUSTRIAL EFFECTS OF A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE USA (Aug. 15,
1990)).
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tween 400,000 and 900,000.107 These studies cite a number of la-
bor-intensive industries as experiencing job losses due to NAFTA,
including textiles, apparel, electronics, glass products, and agricul-
tural products.' 08 These U.S. industries currently benefit from high
U.S. import tariffs and would suffer if these tariffs were removed be-
cause Mexico is very competitive in these product areas. 10 9
The most recent study released by the Institute for International
Economics labels NAFTA's potential effect on U.S. labor as "small
but not inconsequential." ' 10 According to the report, NAFTA will
result in 112,000 dislocated U.S. workers, but will generate about
130,000 additional U.S. jobs, as well as 609,000 jobs in Mexico."'
VII. Curbing the Negative Effects of NAFTA
A recent newspaper article summarized the view of many who
are currently considering the prospect of NAFTA:
The fact is that trade is good for workers on both sides of the border
only when it is carried out side-by-side with minimum standards on
wages, benefits, safety and environment. Otherwise, it only serves as
a vehicle for capital to locate where labor is cheap and government
governs least.' 12
A. Legislative Aid
Members of Congress who support and empathize with the
American blue collar worker have asked the Administration for as-
surances that as a result of NAFTA, the U.S. will not be pulled down
to the "lowest common denominator," meaning Mexico's minimal
labor and environmental standards. For example, in November,
1991, U.S. Representative Henry Waxman (D-Cal.) and twenty-one
co-sponsors introduced a resolution stating that the enabling legisla-
tion for NAFTA would not be approved by Congress if NAFTAjeop-
ardizes U.S. safety, health, environmental, or labor laws. 1 3 Rep.
Waxman is demanding specific language in the GATT draft lan-
guage' 14 as proof that the Administration will live up to commit-
107 Id. at 25-26 (citing ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF DIRECT
FOREIGN INVESTMENT SHIFTS DUE TO THE PROPOSED U.S.-MEXICO FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
(May 15, 1991), and ROBERT COHEN & ALAN TONELSON, ECONOMIC STRATEGY INSTITUTE,
DOING IT RIGHT: A WINNING STRATEGY FOR U.S.-MEXICO TRADE (1991)).
108 Id. at 26.
109 d.
I 10 U.S. Trade to Improve by About $9 Billion a Year Under NAFTA, Report Says, Daily Rep.
Executives (BNA) No. 40, at A-12 (Feb. 28, 1992) (quoting GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER &JEF-
FREY SCHOTr, INST. FOR INT'L ECONOMICS, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS (Feb. 27, 1992)).
Id.
112 Kirkland, supra note 12, at 6.
113 Waxman Urges Congress Not to Pass Pacts Without Health, Safety Guarantees, supra note
72, at A-6.
114 Id. The current Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations is expected to "lock in"
provisions in NAFTA. The Waxman resolution "was prompted by a preliminary finding
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ments made in the "action plan" introduced by the Administration in
May in order to secure votes for an extension of fast-track negotiat-
ing authority."15  Similarly, House Majority Leader Richard
Gephardt (D-Mo.) plans to introduce legislation allowing sharehold-
ers to "blow the whistle" on U.S. companies operating in foreign
countries if labor and environmental standards are violated." 16
One option suggested by economist Peter Morici of the Univer-
sity of Maine allows NAFTA to be completed and at least temporarily
pacifies some U.S. labor groups.' '7 Explaining that U.S. workers will
have to make a much greater adjustment than President Bush admits,
Morici suggests that the United States "be realistic about its ability to
adjust and ask for long phase-in periods of up to ten to twenty years
in sensitive sectors" such as apparel, vegetables, food processing,
and automotive parts."l 8 Such a phase-in period would allow
younger workers whose jobs are threatened to be retrained before be-
ing handed their walking papers and older workers to perhaps qual-
ify for retirement.
Also, Congress could refuse to approve NAFTA unless and until
NAFTA's potential negative effects on labor are proscribed via a
Charter of Rights similar to the Social Charter adopted by the Euro-
pean Common Market.I19 Such a Charter could "guarantee the
highest standards of rights and income" in the forthcoming North
American trading bloc instead of "securing wages and conditions re-
duced to the lowest common denominator."'' 20
B. Worker Readjustment Programs
An efficient way to curb the effects of NAFTA may be to directly
aid those who are most harmed by it. A 1981 study found that while
trade results in a net gain for the U.S. economy, the gain is "accom-
panied by reduced employment opportunities and adjustment bur-
dens for workers in import-competing industries."' 2' The study
by a GAIT panel in favor of Mexico that dolphin protection measures under the U.S.
Mammal Protection Act violated existing GATT rules." Id. The resolution demands that
the Administration make GATT more compatible with U.S. laws. Id.
115 Id. The "action plan" includes a commitment by the administration to a workers
adjustment program for workers dislocated due to NAFTA and a U.S.-Mexico understand-
ing regarding joint action on such labor issues as health and safety measures and working
conditions. Id.
116 North American Free Trade Agreement: Election Could Affect Timing, Daily Rep. Executives
(BNA) No. 10, at S-8 (Jan. 15, 1992).
117 Administration Underestimates NAFTA Impact on Workers, Hill Coalition Told, Daily Rep.
Executives (BNA) No. 218, at A-3 (Nov. 12, 1991).
118 Id. Morici advocates a "very aggressive agenda" with Mexico which addresses
more than the issues addressed in the U.S.-Canada FTA and which results in Mexican
institutions becoming more like those in the U.S. Id.
119 Kirkland, supra note 12, at 6.
120 Bacon, supra note 46, at 6.
121 EMPLOYMENT IN THE U.S., supra note 97, at 4 (citing Michael C. Aho & James A.
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goes on to claim that the "adjustment burden falls more often on
women, minorities, the less-educated, and the lower paid - the
groups least able to afford it."122
There are two worker readjustment programs through which
displaced workers are currently aided by the government: 123 The
Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act which
emphasizes retraining over cash payments, t24 and the Trade Adjust-
ment Assistance Program which is specifically designed to help work-
ers unfairly impacted by foreign trade through cash benefits, worker
retraining, job relocation, and placement services. 125 However, ex-
isting adjustment programs are labelled "inadequate" by the Inter-
national Trade Commissioner who states that a new mechanism will
have to be developed, as well as a program of adult remedial educa-
tion.' 26 Furthermore, although the Bush Administration promised
that "any trade negotiations would focus on the need" for worker
readjustment programs, this same Administration has, on several oc-
casions, proposed that the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program be
abolished.' 27
On October 30, 1991, Senators William Roth (R-Del) and Pat-
rick Moynihan (D-NY) introduced a bill (S 1894) to beef up the cur-
Orr, Trade-Sensitive Employment: Who are the Affected Workers?, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 1981,
at 29).
122 Id.
123 DOL Official Pledges Effort to Help Workers Dislocated by Mexico Trade Pact, Daily Rep.
Executives (BNA) No. 193, at A-18 (Oct. 4, 1991).
124 REIFMAN, supra note 39, at 8. Under this program, each state receives 80% of all
program funds appropriated and are required to submit a plan for how the funds will be
used. The remaining 20% of the funds are allocated by the Secretary of Labor to exem-
plary state and local programs. States are directed to provide workers with rapid response
to plant closings including information on available financial assistance, job counseling
and training, and financial assistance for workers who have exhausted unemployment ben-
efits as long as these workers are participating in a job retraining and education program.
Jackson, supra note 22, at 55.
125 Senate Finance Members Introduce Bill to Assure Adjustment Benefits Under NAFTA, Daily
Rep. Executives (BNA) No. 211, at A-7, (Oct. 31, 1991). This program is only available to
workers whose displacement was caused by imports and who can prove such displacement
by going through a three-tiered scheme of determinations before receiving any benefits.
Not only is the determination procedure cumbersome, the funding of the program is ques-
tionable since assistance is supposed to be funded by an import fee of 15% or whatever
amount is needed to implement the program on all imported sale merchandise in the
United States. Jackson, supra note 22, at 55.
126 ITC's Newquist Questions U.S. Worker Skills for Jobs Created Under NAFTA, Daily Rep.
Executives (BNA) No. 220, at A-17 (Nov. 14, 1991). The Trade Adjustment Assistance
Program does not incorporate "early intervention, an emphasis on rapid return to work,
employee involvement, and broad-based eligibility." It also neglects to cover workers
whose jobs are lost due to forms of dislocation other than import competition, such as
when U.S. companies are moved to Mexico. DOL Official Pledges Effort To Help Workers Dislo-
cated by Mexico Trade Pact, supra note 123, at A-18 (quoting Robert Jones, Assistant Secre-
tary of Labor for Employment and Training).
127 Id.
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rent Trade Adjustment Assistance program. 128 The bill would
impose a temporary fee on imports at the U.S. border to pay for af-
fected workers' benefits and would raise the current $80 million cap
on training to $100 million. 129
Currently, there is much disagreement over how to combat
worker displacement and whether to rely on or redesign one of the
readjustment programs already in place, or to create a new package
of displacement benefits.130 A February 1992 study done by the In-
stitute for International Economics found that $900 million over five
years should be set aside for worker adjustment to combat the
112,000 U.S. jobs forecasted to be lost due to NAFTA. 131
C. Re-educating the U.S. Worker
Now that our world economy has become globalized, if we can-
not produce "quality, variety, customization, convenience and state
of the art products at mass production prices," someone else will.'
3 2
By most accounts, we cannot put together a finished piece of apparel
as rapidly as the Italians, we cannot produce a car as efficiently as the
Japanese, and we are way behind our competitors in research and
development.133 But perhaps no longer being a strong manufactur-
ing country is not all bad. For example, according to one theory,
along with the access to cheap Mexican labor will come a new wave
of high tech jobs in the United States; we will develop a new forte. 134
But will the average U.S. worker be qualified to fill these newly cre-
ated positions?
Perhaps the problem lies in the fact that not only is our economy
built on a theory of mass production, but our education system is
also quantity oriented. We teach young students that knowledge is
something to be memorized and transferred, but not applied.13 5 We
must work to transform our education system so that young students
will be taught how to practically apply their knowledge and to de-
128 Senate Finance Members Introduce Bill to Assure Adjustment Benefits under NAFTA, supra
note 125, at A-7.
129 Id. This bill would force "those who enjoy the benefits of free trade [to] be willing
to lend a hand to those who are hurt by it." Id.
130 ITC's Newquist Questions U.S. Worker Skills for Jobs Created Under NAFTA, supra note
126, at A-17.
131 U.S. Trade to Improve by About $9 Billion a Year Under NAFTA, Report Says, supra note
110, at A-12 (quoting GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY SCHOTr, INST. FOR INT'L ECON.,
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Feb. 27, 1992)).
132 Anthony P. Carnevale, Human Resources: The Key to Canada-U.S. Competitiveness, 16
CAN-U.S. L.J. 7, 16 (1990).
133 Id.
134 Rep. Archer Defends Employment Impact of Proposed North American Trade Pact, Daily Rep.
Executives (BNA) No. 173, at A-17 (Sept. 6, 1991).
135 Carnevale, supra note 132, at 11. Carnevale uses the example that although 30%
of high school graduates know the names of Columbus' three ships, none of them know
"whose ships they were, why Columbus was using those ships or where he was going." Id.
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velop necessary interpersonal and organizational skills. This trans-
formation could result in the flexibility our work force needs in order
to compete globally.' 3 6 But what about the older blue-collar worker
who will lose the job she has had for more than twenty years? How
can we expect her to become more flexible?
International Trade Commissioner Don Newquist calls for a
program of "adult remedial education."' 3 7 But most businesses are
ill-equipped to offer employee learning and retraining in the organi-
zations themselves.138 And even if there were a place for these older
workers to be reeducated, no one wants to pay for it. The govern-
ment cannot afford the several billion dollars that a tax break for
reeducation would cost, and small businesses would drown if they
were forced to shoulder the burden.'19 Perhaps the answer is decen-
tralization' 40 or privatization of education. In other words, allow the
government to "farm out" the job of educating and re-educating
Americans to private companies with economic know-how and busi-
ness sense. These companies would then accept grants from the
government and money from investors and perhaps advertisers and
use it to pay qualified teachers a respectable salary and to develop a
repertoire of ways to teach practical skills and useful knowledge.
Regarding dislocated workers, there are those who say "Bush's
obligation [is] to construct a safety net for them, while securing the
greater economic gain for everyone else."' 14 1 But Bush supporters
question why dislocated workers "deserve help any more than, say,
construction workers who are laid off because of recession?"' 42
Perhaps such questions are merely skirting a much deeper issue:
The U.S. goal "must be to be able to compete with [Japan and the
European Community] in high-skill, high-tech, high-value-added
sectors. Protecting low wage sectors prejudices these high-wage sec-
tors by limiting foreign earnings and hence U.S. exports.' 143 The
Administration knows that of the hundreds of thousands of U.S.
workers whose jobs will be lost when trade barriers with Mexico are
eliminated, 144 most will not be able to be retrained to work in these
high-wage sectors. However, if the U.S. wishes to compete in the
same league with the highly industrialized countries, we must deter-
136 Id. at 23.
137 ITC's Newquist Questions U.S. Worker Skills for Jobs Created Under NAFTA, supra note
126, at A-17.
138 Carnevale, supra note 132, at 15.
'39 Id. at 23-24.
140 Id. at 24.
141 Good Sense on Mexican Trade, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1991, at 16E.
142 Id.
143 Sidney Weintraub, An Overview of North American Free Trade: Economic, Political, Social,
and Environmental Issues in U.S. LIBR. CONG., CONG. RES. SERVICES, REP. No. 91-786 E,
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS 28, 35 (Oct. 22,
1991).
144 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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mine what "share of resources should be devoted to protecting low-
wage jobs as compared with resources needed to validate a high-
wage economy."1 45 So perhaps it is true that President Bush "wants
the overall benefit of unrestricted trade with Mexico without worry-
ing about the costs to individuals who lose their jobs or face down-
ward pressure on their wages." 146 But justice requires that someone
"worry" about these individuals.
VIII. Conclusion
Due to the Republicans' desire not to mobilize the U.S. labor
force or lose the election, the final draft of NAFTA may have to wait
until after the 1992 presidential election. If President Bush is not
reelected, it is possible that the current NAFTA negotiations will be
halted, fast track authority will be forfeited, and NAFTA talks will
become more open and well thought out. Regardless of who wins
the presidential race, NAFTA will eventually be enacted because
Mexico so desperately wants a FTA with the U.S. and because the
U.S. always wants to be on the cutting edge of trade trends. In the
long run, NAFTA may be just the shot in the arm that our country
needs to boost its economy. But more likely, NAFTA will be one of
those treaties created under the presumptuous "trickle down" the-
ory whose benefits never quite trickle all the way down to the level of
individuals who are in the greatest need.
To diminish the harsh reality of hundreds of thousands of lost
U.S. jobs and to prevent Mexico from becoming an "enormous res-
ervoir of cheap labor,"' 147 Congress must refuse to pass NAFTA en-
abling legislation unless and until: (1) a Charter of Rights is drafted
in correlation with NAFTA to guarantee high labor standards, collec-
tive bargaining, and health and safety protection; (2) an efficient and
practical worker readjustment program is implemented to ensure
that U.S. workers are provided extended unemployment benefits,job
retraining, and placement assistance; and (3) procedures are in-
stalled so that sensitive sectors and industries where U.S. jobs are in
the most jeopardy are slowly "phased in" to NAFTA in periods of up
to twenty years to give these sectors necessary readjustment time.
DEDRA L. WILBURN
145 Weintraub, supra note 143, at 35.
146 Id.
147 Bacon, supra note 46, at 6.
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